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Comments
Contra Tufts: The Case Against The
Fair Market Value Limitation on
Amount Realized
As the title suggests, the main thrust of this comment is an explora-
tion of Tufts v. Commissioner,' a case recently handed down by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; it should be noted,
however, that this narrative has its roots in the early decades of the
present century. This saga begins in 1932 when Mrs. Beulah Crane
inherited an apartment building and lot subject to a nonrecourse mort-
gage from her late husband.z The widow Crane sold the property in
1938,3 and then the problem arose. Mrs. Crane and the Internal Reve-
nue Service (hereinafter referred to as I.R.S.) disagreed about the
proper method with which to calculate the gain realized by the tax-
payer on the sale of the building.4 Basically, the controversy revolved
around two issues: (1) whether the amount of nonrecourse debt to
which property is subject should be included in calculating the basis of
property received from a decedent;5 and (2) whether the taxpayer must
include the amount of such nonrecourse debt assumed by the buyer in
amount realized upon the disposition of property subject to a nonre-
course mortgage.6
Choosing to fight, Mrs. Crane battled relentlessly against the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue (hereinafter referred to as the Commis-
sioner). The dispute was finally resolved by the United States Supreme
Court.7 In the end, the views of the Commissioner were adopted,8 but
1. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981) cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3881 (U.S. May 3, 1982) (No. 81-
1536).
2. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 3 (1947).
3. Id.
4. See id. at 3-5.
5. See id. at 5-11.
6. See id. at 12.
7. See id. at 1.
8. See generally 331 U.S. 1.
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it cannot be said that Mrs. Crane lost.9
The holding in Crane v. Commissioner allows taxpayers to include
the amount of nonrecourse debt in calculating basis.' Because depre-
ciation deductions are calculated from the taxpayer's basis in prop-
erty," an increase in basis results in increased yearly depreciation
deductions. Thus the Crane case laid the foundation for most tax
shelters. 12
While taking advantage of the benefits' 3 resulting from being able to
include the amount of nonrecourse debt in basis, taxpayers have balked
at complying with the second portion of the Crane holding which re-
quires that they include the nonrecourse debt assumed by the buyer in
the amount realized.' 4 Attempting to avoid complying with this man-
date, taxpayers have argued that footnote 37 of Crane'5 limits the
amount realized to the fair market value of the property, if that value is
less than the amount of debt assumed by the buyer.16 This proposition
was never accepted by a court, 17 until 1981, when the Fifth Circuit
decided Tufts. In Tufts the Fifth Circuit held that the amount realized
must be limited to the fair market value of the property transferred if
the amount of the nonrecourse debt exceeded the fair market value.' 8
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit rejected the "economic
benefit ' 19 theory, which it saw as the theoretical justification for the
Crane doctrine.20
The purpose of this comment is to show that if the portion of the
Crane doctrine which allows nonrecourse debt to be included in basis
is left undisturbed, and it should be 2 then the full amount of nonre-
9. See Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv. 277,
283 n.l 1 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Bittker), wherein the author offers an autographed copy of his
article to the I.R.S. lawyer to write the best essay entitled "Pyrrhic Victories I Have Come to Rue."
10. See 331 U.S. at 11.
11. See I.R.C. §167(g) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
12. Bittker, supra note 9, at 283.
13. See text accompanying notes 66-83 infra, for a description of these benefits.
14. See 331 U.S. at 14.
15. See text accompanying note 92, infra.
16. See generally Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978), Parker v. Delaney,
186 F.2d 455 (Ist Cir. 1950); Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320 (1947) (cases in which
this argument has been made).
17. See Del Cotto, Basis andAmount.Realized Under Crane: 4 Current View ofSome Tax
Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PENN. L. REv. 69, 85-86 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Del
Cotto]. But see 186 F.2d at 458. Dicta in this case indicates that the First Circuit accepted the
theory suggested by footnote 37, but the court went on to find that the fair market value of the
property at least equaled the amount of the nonrecourse debt. Id.
18. See 651 F.2d 1058, 1063 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3881 (U.S. May 3,
1982) (No. 81-1536).
19. See notes 169-178 and accompanying text infra.
20. See 651 F.2d at 1061.
21. See generally Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Basis." Mrs. Crane Where Are You Now?,
53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Simmons I]. See notes 152-167 and accompany-
ing text infra.
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course debt assumed by a transferee must be included in the trans-
feror's amount realized, regardless of the fair market value of the real
property.22
This comment will commence with a detailed discussion of the
Crane case,23 followed by a generalized discussion of real estate tax
shelters, their goals, and the mechanics behind them. 4 The role of the
depreciation deduction in tax shelters will be discussed at length, with
emphasis placed on the governmental policies sought to be imple-
mented by allowing depreciation deductions.2 5 Finally, the relation of
the Crane doctrine to tax shelters will be explored through a two-part
analysis: (1) the advantages created by including nonrecourse debt in
basis; and (2) the disadvantages created by mandating that the full
amount of nonrecourse debt assumed be included in the amount real-
ized.26 The latter necessitates an inquiry into the underlying rationale
of footnote 37 and why this theory is so very attractive to investor
taxpayers.2 7
The facts and the holding of the Tufts case will be discussed in detail,
as will the the significance of the Fifth Circuit's adoption of the fair
market value limitation of footnote 37.28 This will be followed by a
brief discussion the purpose of which is to illustrate that despite the
problems involved, the inclusion of nonrecourse debt in basis is the
most practical and theoretically consistent solution to the problem of
how to treat nonrecourse debt when calculating basis.2 9 The holding in
Tufts will then be shown to be unacceptable and indefensible.30 The
arguments made by the Fifth Circuit will be explained, carefully ana-
lyzed, and refuted.3' This comment concedes that the Fifth Circuit's
analysis of the "economic benefit" theory is the only logical one, and
that the holding in Tufts is consistent with the rationale of the "eco-
nomic benefit" theory. The Fifth Circuit's analysis, however, it will be
argued, is too simplistic because it ignores the Crane court's concern
with what it termed "double deductions. 32 The Fifth Circuit argues
that even if the Supreme Court had been concerned with the occur-
22. "Failure to include the full amount of the debt in amount realized permits an investor to
obtain an unjustified tax benefit. ... Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt andAmount Realized- The
Demise of Crane's Footnote 37, 59 OR. L. REv. 3, 4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Simmons II].
23. See notes 36-65 and accompanying text infra.
24. See notes 66-74 and accompanying text infra.
25. See notes 75-80 and accompanying text infra.
26. See notes 81-89 and accompanying text infra.
27. See notes 90-93 and accompanying text infra.
28. See notes 102-135 and accompanying text infra.
29. See notes 143-167 and accompanying text infra.
30. See Bittker, supra note 9, at 284.
31. See notes 168-205 and accompanying text infra.
32. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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rence of "double deductions," that concern was unmerited because
double deductions are made impossible by the necessary adjustments
to basis.33 It will be shown that this argument is fallacious and evi-
dences an acute misunderstanding of the delicate interrelation between
the various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter re-
ferred to as I.R.C.), dealing with basis, depreciation, and amount
realized.34
Finally, taxpayer Tufts' assertion that the fair market value limita-
tion set forth in footnote 37 was enacted into law by I.R.C. section
752(c) will be explored at length, and refuted through an examination
of Congressional discussion made pursuant to its enactment.35
CRANE
The Crane case is a pivotal one in tax history.36 In a two-part hold-
ing that has become known as the Crane doctrine the United States
Supreme Court (1) allowed taxpayers to include the full amount of
nonrecourse debt in calculating their basis in property,37 and (2) man-
dated that the amount of nonrecourse debt, which the transferee as-
sumed or took subject to,38 be included in the amount realized for
purposes of calculating gain or loss on the transaction. 9
A. The Facts and Arguments
The Crane case involved the sale of an apartment building that Mrs.
Beulah Crane had inherited from her husband in 1932.40 The building
was encumbered by a nonrecourse debt of $262,042.5041 and was ap-
praised at a value equal to the debt for federal estate tax purposes.42
For seven years she took deductions for taxes, interest, and deprecia-
tion.43 In 1938 the taxpayer sold the property to a third party who
assumed the nonrecourse debt and paid $3000 cash." A gain of $1250
33. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1981).
34. See notes 179-197 and accompanying text infra.
35. See notes 210-235 and accompanying text infra.
36. See Friedland, Tufts and Millar. Two New Views of the Crane Case and Its Famous
Footnote, 57 THE NOTRE DAME LAW. 510 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Friedland].
37. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).
38. "[Oin a sale or exchange of the encumbered property, this liability is included in the
amount realized on the sale or exchange, whether the buyer assumes the liability or merely takes
the property subject thereto." Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax:
A Problem ofCreeping Confusion, 14 TAx L. REv. 225, 227 (1959). For purposes of this comment
the terms "assumes the liability" and "takes subject to the liability" will be used interchangeably.
39. See 331 U.S. at 14.
40. Id. at 3.
41. See id. (consisting of $255,000 of principal and interest in default amounting to
$7,042.50).
42. See id.
43. See id. The depreciation deductions claimed and allowed totaled $25,500. Id. at n.2.
44. See 331 U.S. at 3.
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was reported as resulting from this transaction.45 The Internal Reve-
nue Service assessed a deficiency, claiming that the taxpayer had real-
ized a net taxable gain of $23,767.03.46 The widely differing figures
resulted from different interpretations of two terms: basis in property47
and amount realized.48
The Internal Revenue Code defines the basis in property received
from a decedent as the fair market value of the property at the time of
death.49 Mrs. Crane argued that theproperty she had received from her
late husband was the equity in the property, not the building.50 At the
time of Mr. Crane's deatfi, the fair market value and the amount of the
mortgage were deemed to be equal;5 therefore, the taxpayer argued,
her basis in the property was zero.5 2 Furthermore, Mrs. Crane con-
tended that the amount realized 53 on the transfer of the property was
the net cash received, $2,500.14 A capital gain of $1,250 was declared
after the taxpayer took advantage of the then current fifty percent capi-
tal gains deduction. 5
The Commissioner argued that the property Mrs. Crane inherited
was the entire building not just her late husband's equity in the build-
ing.56 This position was consistent with the actions of the taxpayer in
taking depreciation deductions for almost seven years57 and calculating
the deduction from a basis equal to the fair market value of the build-
ing at the time of Mr. Crane's demise.5" The Commissioner also con-
tended that the amount realized by the taxpayer involved the principal
amount of the mortgage assumed by the buyer.59
45. See Id.
46. See id. at 4.
47. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939, c. 1, §113(a)(5), 53 Stat. 41 (current version at I.R.C.
§1014(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
48. See id. §11l(b), at 47 (current version at I.R.C. §1001(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
49. See id. §1 13(a)(5), at 41.
50. See 331 U.S. at 3.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3-4.
53. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939 §11l(b) at 37 (defining amount realized as "the sum
of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received").
54. See 331 U.S. at 3 (of the $3,000 cash received, $500 was used to pay for the expense of the
sale).
55. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939 §117(b), at 47 (current version at I.R.C. §1202 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980)) (the deduction has been increased to sixty percent of the net capital gain,
subsequent to the Crane case).
56. See 331 U.S. at 4.
57. See id. at 3.
58. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939 §23(n), at 14 (current version at I.R.C. §167(g) (1976
& Supp. IV 1981)). The basis from which the depreciation deduction is calculated is the tax-
payers basis in the property for determining gain or loss from the dispostion of the property. Id.
59. See 331 U.S. at 4.
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B. The Holding
The Court rejected Mrs. Crane's contention that the property which
she had received from her husband was merely his equity in the build-
ing.60 The Court reached this conclusion by arguing that property and
equity are not synonymous. 61 The I.R.C. speaks in terms of the basis in
property not in equity,62 and there is, furthermore, no evidence that
Congress has used the two words interchangeably or with confusion.63
The Court went on to formulate what is often referred to as the Crane
doctrine. This two-part holding accepted the views posited by the
Commissioner. The first part of the Crane doctrine requires the tax-
payer to include the full amount of the nonrecourse debt in calculating
the tax basis.6' The second part mandates that the amount of nonre-
course debt assumed by the transferee be included in the amount real-
ized for purposes of calculating gain or loss on the transaction.65
C. The Practical Signjfcance of Crane: Tax Shelters
Crane allows the taxpayer to include the amount of nonrecourse debt
in calculating the basis of the property acquired from a decedent. 6
Subsequent cases extended the Crane doctrine by authorizing taxpayers
to include the full amount of nonrecourse debt in the basis of property
purchased by the taxpayer,' resulting in an increase in the taxpayer's
basis. The depreciation deduction allowed is calculated from the tax
basis.68 Because the depreciation deduction is calculated from basis
and Crane allows the taxpayer an increased basis, it allows higher de-
preciation deductions. This forms the foundation for tax shelters. 9
Tax shelters are investments undertaken to fulfill specific tax saving
goals, deferral of taxation, and conversion of ordinary income to capi-
tal gains.7" Deferral is achieved when the tax deductions from the in-
vestment exceed the taxable income generated. These losses may then
offset the taxpayer's income which is unrelated to the investment activ-
60. See generally id.
61. See id. at 6-7.
62. See id. at 6.
63. See id. at 8 (in those instances when either the Congress or the Treasury intended to
convey the meaning of equity, it did so by the use of appropriate language).
64. See id. at 11.
65. See id. at 14.
66. See generally id.
67. See generally Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (Ist Cir. 1950); Blackstone Theatre Co. v.
Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801 (1949).
68. See I.R.C. §167(g) (Supp. IV 1980).
69. See Simmons I, supra note 21, at 58.
70. The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearings Before the House
Wavs and Means Comm, on the President's 1978 Tax Program, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1978),
reprinted in 3 TAx MGMT. (BNA) Series LI1 §465 [hereinafter cited as President's Proposals]; see
Del Cotto, supra note 17, at 95.
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ity.7t Emphasis must be placed on the fact that over the life of the
transaction the taxpayer will pay taxes on the same income.72 The pay-
ment, however, is deferred until the income generated exceeds the
losses.73 By deferring the payment of taxes, the investor has, in effect,
obtained an interest-free loan from the federal government.74
The mechanism that allows the tax losses generated by the invest-
ment to exceed the income generated is the depreciation deduction.75
The purpose of this deduction is to allow the taxpayer to recover the
cost of an asset used in the trade or business 76 or "held for the produc-
tion of income' 7 7 tax free while the asset is in use.78 Over the years,
depreciation allowances have been liberalized.79 Congress has enacted
these liberalized methods of calculating depreciation deductions on the
theory that an accelerated recovery of capital by investors, through
large tax deductions during the early years of the asset's life, would
increase the supply of capital in the market place; this would then lead
to increased investment activities and thus result in business
expansion. 80
If the investment is debt financed, two further benefits accrue to the
taxpayer." First, the investor is able to enjoy the depreciation deduc-
tion without an extensive out-of-pocket investment and the interest
71. President's Proposals, supra note 70, at 224.
72. See A. ARNOLD, TAX SHELTERS IN REAL ESTATE TODAY 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
ARNOLD]; see also Del Cotto, supra note 17, at 95.
73. President's Proposals, supra note 70, at 224.74. President's Proposals, supra note 70, at 224; ARNOLD, supra note 72, at 5.75. President's Proposals, supra note 70, at 224.
Depreciation deductions offset current gross income and thus allow the investor to re-
ceive income from the property or from other sources without current tax liability. For
tax purposes, this tax-free income represents a return of the capital committed to the
property and is accounted for by reducing basis. (footnote omitted)
Simmons II, supra note 22, at 20.
76. I.R.C. §167(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
77. Id. §167(a)(2).
78. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1954), reprinted in 2 TAX MGMT. (BNA)
§ 167.
79. See id.; see also I.R.C. §168 (setting forth the new methods of depreciation).
80. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1954), reprinted in 2 TAX MGMT. (BNA)
§ 167. The Committee states:
The faster tax writeoffwould increase available working capital and materially aid grow-
ing businesses in the financing of their expansion. For all segments of the American
economy, liberalized depreciation policies should assist modernization and expansion of
industrial capacity, with resulting growth, increased production, and a higher standard
of living.
Id. But see President's Proposals, supra note 70, at 55, wherein former Secretary Blumenthal
states:
Typically, shelter investments are madi not because of anticipated economic productiv-
ity, but in anticipation of the various tax preferences that are packaged together by shel-
ter promoters to provide optimum tax writeoffs. This drain of investment dollars into
shelter activities creates economic distortions and harms legitimate profit-seeking
businesses.
81. See President's Proposals, supra note 70, at 224 (describing leverage as the use of some-
one else's money to finance an investment activity).
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paid on the debt is usually deductible.82 The Crane doctrine makes
debt-financed investments even more attractive because the taxpayer
can include the full amount of the debt in basis, thus enjoying the de-
preciation deductions, without being personally liable on the debt.
3
Traditionally, however, there has been a dark side for taxpayers who
have invested in tax shelters."4 This occurs once the large depreciation
deductions have been taken and the taxpayer's basis has been re-
duced.' The investment begins to produce taxable income.86 The tax-
payer, at this time, may find it wise to sell or transfer the property to a
third party. If the buyer takes subject to the nonrecourse, then Crane
mandates that the seller include the amount of debt assumed in the
amount realized. 7 Since the taxpayer's basis has been adjusted down-
ward to reflect the depreciation deductions taken, 88 a gain will be real-
ized, a gain that must be included in gross income.8 9
In attempts to vitiate the consequences resulting from the inclusion
of the nonrecourse debt assumed by the transferee in the amount real-
ized, taxpayers have argued that an exception to this mandate was cre-
ated by the United States Supreme Court in Crane.90 These arguments
are based on footnote 37 of Crane, considered to be the most famous
footnote in tax history.91 The court stated:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the
mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a
benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem
might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or
transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot.92
For many years taxpayers have been taking advantage of the portion
of the Crane doctrine which allows them to include the full amount of
nonrecourse debt in basis, thus increasing their depreciation deduc-
tions. Taxpayers have asserted that footnote 37 provides authority for
limiting the amount realized by the taxpayer to the fair market value of
82. ARNOLD, supra note 72, at 5; see also I.R.C. §163.
83. See generally Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
84. See Comment, Tufts v. Commissioner-The Resurrection of Crane's Footnote 37, 9 FLA.
ST. U.L. Rnv. 575, 580 (1982).
85. See I.R.C. §1016 (which provides that the tax basis must be adjusted downward to reflect
the extent of the depreciation deduction taken, or to the extent allowable).
86. See Comment, supra note 84, at 580.
87. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
88. See I.R.C. §1016.
89. See I.R.C. §61(a)(3) (including gains from dealings in property in gross income),
90. See generally Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980); Millar v.
Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1978); Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950).
91. See Bittker, supra note 9, at 277.
92. 331 U.S. at 14 n.37 (emphasis added).
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the property, if that value is less than the amount of the debt.93
In Millar v. Commissioner94 (hereinafter referred to as Millar), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the tax-
payer's contentions that footnote 37 created an exception to the
amounts realized portion of Crane.95 Two months after the decision in
Millar,96 the United States Tax Court followed the lead of the Third
Circuit and in the case of TufS 9 7 it rejected the taxpayer's argument.98
It appeared as if the taxpayers would never obtain a victory in this
area; one learned commentator even heralded the "Demise of Crane's
Footnote 37. " 99 During the summer of 1981, however, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court's decision in Tufts,"°° demonstrating that foot-
note 37 was alive and well.101
TUFTS V THE COMMISSIONER
In Tufts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that when property subject to a nonrecourse debt is transferred to
a buyer who assumes the debt, the seller's amount realized is limited to
the fair market value of the property, if that value is less than the
amount of the nonrecourse debt.10 2 Concluding that "the fair market
value limitation so '[o]bviously' anticipated by footnote 37 is war-
ranted,"'0 3 the Fifth Circuit became the first court in the country to
accept the proposition that footnote 37 created an exception to the
amount realized portion of the Crane doctrine."° Since Tufts is des-
tined to be a significant case,105 it is worthwhile to examine in depth the
facts that gave rise to the controversy.
A. The Facts
In 1970, the Tufts became partners in a general partnership. The
partnership undertook to build an apartment complex costing
93. See generally Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978); Parker v. Delaney,
186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950); Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320 (1947).
94. 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
95. See generally id.
96. See Simmons II, supra note 22, at 29.
97. Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
98. See generally id.
99. See Simmons II, supra note 72, at 3 (this article is entitled Nonrecourse Debt andAmount
Realized- The Demise of Crane's Footnote 37).
100. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1052, 1063 (5th Cir. 1981).
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Del Cotto, supra note 17, at 85-86.
105. See Simmons, Tufts v. Commissioner. Amount RealizedLimitedto Fair Market Value, 15
U.C.D. L. REv. 577, 577-78 (1982). [hereinafter cited as Simmons III].
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$1,851,500,106 totally financed by nonrecourse debt.' 7 During 1970,
the Tufts made a cash contribution of $2,771 to the partnership. 8
From 1970 to 1972 the taxpayers claimed and were allowed deductions
for ordinary losses totalling $82,984.25,1°9 and depreciation deductions
of $27,008.75.11o In 1972 the partners, having failed to turn the venture
into a profit-making enterprise, sold their partnership interests to a
third party who took subject to the nonrecourse mortgage and paid no
boot."' At the time of the sale, the fair market value of the complex
was determined to be $1,400,000.112 The fair market value of the Tufts'
interest was $350,000, their share of the partnership liability assumed
by the transferee was $462,875.113 This was exactly the situation de-
scribed by the Supreme Court in footnote 37 of Crane; the fair market
value of the property was less than the amount of nonrecourse debt
assumed by the buyer.
The taxpayers indicated a loss" 4 on their federal income tax return
for 1972.11 They used footnote 37 to support their contention that the
amount realized should be limited to the fair market value of the trans-
ferred property, when that amount is exceeded by the nonrecourse debt
assumed by the buyer. 16 The Commissioner, asserting that the full
amount of nonrecourse debt must be included in the amount realized,
determined that the taxpayers had realized a gain.117
The focal issue in Tufts is whether the amount realized by the tax-
payer in a taxable exchange should be limited to the fair market value
of the property interest, when the fair market value is less than the
amount of the nonrecourse debt assumed by the transferee. The Tax
Court favored the Commissioner's view and held that the taxpayers
106. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 759 (1978), rep'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1931)
(the adjusted basis of the Tuft's partnership interest was $462,875).
107. See id. at 758.
108. See 1d. at 759.
109. See id. at 760.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 761.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 762.
114. See I.R.C. §1001 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (loss is defined as the amount by which the
adjusted basis exceeds amount realized).
The loss was calculated by the following equation:
Amount Realized - $350,000
(minus) Adjusted Basis - $355,563
Loss - $ 5,563
115. See 70 T.C. at 761.
116. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1059 (5th Cir. 1981).
117. See 70 T.C. at 761; see also I.R.C. §1001(a) (gain is the excess of the amount realized over
the adjusted basis).
Amount Realized - $462,875
(minus) Adjusted Basis - $355,563
Gain - $107,312
1982 / Contra Tufts
had to include the full amount of the nonrecourse debt assumed by the
buyer in the amount realized, regardless of the fair market value of the
property at the time of the transaction."18 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, acknowledging that their decision was "in direct conffict with
decisions in other circuits,""' 9 reversed the decision of the Tax
Court.' 2 0
B The Holding
Finding fault with what it considered to be the theoretical founda-
tion for the Crane doctrine, 12' the Fifth Circuit determined that the
amount realized by the taxpayer who sold property encumbered by a
nonrecourse mortgage should be limited to the fair market value of the
property if that value is less than the amount of the debt.'22
The Fifth Circuit's holding is very favorable to taxpayers. This will
be shown by examining the vastly different tax consequences that can
result from the same transaction depending on whether the Millar view
or the Tufts view is followed.
C. The Sign4cance of Tufts
The Tufts court voiced serious doubts about the validity of the Crane
doctrine, and refused, therefore, to extend it.'2" Part of the Court's
concern stems from a recognition of the "potential for abuse"' 24 inher-
ent in Crane. The Fifth Circuit, however, increases the potential for
abuse because its holding eliminates the mechanism created by the
Crane court to counterbalance the tax benefits which accrue to taxpay-
ers when they are allowed to include the amount of nonrecourse debt in
basis. The basis portion of Crane creates large "paper losses"' 25 that
shelter unrelated income. The portion of Crane which requires the tax-
payer to include the amount of nonrecourse debt assumed by the buyer
in the amount realized provides a mechanism for bringing the previ-
ously untaxed income into the system to be taxed.
12 6
Failure to include the full amount of the debt in amount realized
permits an investor to obtain an unjustified tax benefit ... the al-
lowance of depreciation deductions in excess of the actual investment
118. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 770 (1978).
119. 651 F.2d at 1063 n.9.
120. Id. at 1063.
121. See Id. at 1062.
122. See id. at 1063.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 1063-64 n.9.
125. See President's Proposals, supra note 70, at 55 (statement of W. Michael Blumenthal).
126. Bittker, supra note 9, at 282.
Pacfic Law Journal / Vol 14
over the period the property is held. 127
Under Tufts the taxpayer is still allowed to include the full amount of
nonrecourse debt in basis and thereby enjoys the increased deprecia-
tion deductions. The fair market value limitation that Tufts sanctions,
however, results in taxfree income to the taxpayer, not deferral of taxa-
tion, the traditional goal of tax shelters.
1 28
The split in the circuits created by Tufts may subject taxpayers in-
volved in similar transactions to significantly different tax conse-
quences. The true impact of Tufts is illustrated by an example using
the figures from the Tufts case. A taxpayer in the Third Circuit which
follows Millar must include the full amount of the nonrecourse debt,
assumed by the transferee, in the amount realized.
Amount Realized = $462,875
(minus) Adjusted Basis = $355,563
Gain = $102,312
The amount realized by a taxpayer in the Fifth Circuit or in the newly
created Eleventh Circuit, which elected to follow the precedents
established by the Fifth Circuit as they existed on September 30,
1981,129 is limited to the fair market value of the property.
Amount Realized = $350,000
(minus) Adjusted Basis = $355,563
Loss = $ 5,563
One taxpayer incurs a loss, the other a considerable gain in identical
transactions.
The provisions of the I.R.C. should be interpreted so as to create a
uniform system of taxation. 130 There is no rational basis for a taxpayer
in one area of the country to incur a loss, while a taxpayer in a different
area realizes a taxable gain on an identical transaction. The fortuitous
circumstances of geographic location should not be the determinative
factor in assessing tax consequences.'
3 1
Tax shelters have been criticized as "unfair and unjust,"'132 it has
been asserted that these devices frustrate the goals of a 1rogressive tax
system,133 and that "the continuing spectacle of high income taxpayers
paying little or no tax134 through the use of tax shelters seriously
127. Simmons II, supra note 22, at 4.
128. ARNOLD, supra note 72, at 5.
129. See Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).
130. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
131. See id.
132. President's Proposals, supra note 70, at 35 (testimony of W. Michael Blumenthal).
133. President's Proposals, supra note 70, at 55 (statement of W. Michael Blumenthal).
134. "Data recently compiled by the I.R.S. graphically illuminated the disturbing impact of
tax shelters. Through the use of tax preferences, thousands of affluent Americans are reporting
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undermines taxpayer morale."' 35 The decision in Tufts is certain to
add to the abuses and inequities which already exist.
TOwARDS A RESOLUTION OF THE DILEMMA CREATED
BY FOOTNOTE 37
The Tufts Court asserts that "there is simply no relationship between
basis, adjustments to basis and amount realized," 136 contrary to the as-
sertion of some scholars that the analytical complexities involved in the
Crane doctrine arise as a result of the interrelationship between the
statutory formula for determining gain or loss and the formula for cal-
culating depreciation deductions. 37 The element common to both for-
mulas is basis.'38  Basis is the figure from which the depreciation
deduction is calculated; 39 it is adjusted downward to reflect the
amount of depreciation actually taken, or allowable, 140 and finally the
adjusted basis is subtracted from the amount realized to determine gain
or loss. 4 ' Since the concept of basis is central to the Crane doctrine,
and the manner in which the Crane court chose to handle the prob-
lem 42 of nonrecourse debt and its inclusion in basis, this concept will
be the subject of a brief discussion which undertakes to defend the
Crane position.
A. Including Nonrecourse Debt In Basis
The Tufts court reveals that in its opinion "[t]he real crux of the
problem, ...is the taxpayer's ability to manipulate his basis and ad-
justed basis through the use of nonrecourse financing."' 43 The court
goes on to suggest that the solution to this problem cannot be achieved
by distorting the definition of amount realized.'" The solution lies in
dealing "directly with the definitions of 'basis' and 'adjusted basis,'
either judicially or through legislation."' 145 By this statement the Fifth
Circuit implies as much dissatisfaction with the portion of Crane which
allows the taxpayer to include the full amount of nonrecourse debt in
basis, as the dissatisfaction it expressed with the portion of the Crane
poverty-level incomes for tax purposes." President's Proposals, supra note 70, at 55 (statement of
W. Michael Blumenthal).
135. President's Proposals, supra note 70, at 226 (footnote added).
136. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1064 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981).
137. Simmons I, supra note 21, at 14-15.
138. See generally I.R.C. §§167(g), 1001, 1016 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
139. See id. §167(g).
140. See id. §1016(a)(2).
141. See id. §1001(a).
142. The problem is the potential for abuse. 651 F.2d 1064 n.9.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Id.
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holding which requires the taxpayer to include the amount of debts
assumed by the transferee in the amount realized. 
146
1. The Problem
A theoretical foundation for the dissatisfaction of the Fifth Circuit
with the basis portion of Crane does exist. Increased basis leads to in-
creased depreciation deductions. 47 The purpose for allowing deprecia-
tion deductions is to permit the investor to recover tax free, the cost of
the asset used in the trade or business or held for the production of
income;' 4 this in turn will free capital to be invested and thus promote
economic expansion.' 49 To the extent that a taxpayer's basis in prop-
erty includes the debt on which the taxpayer is not personally liable,
allowing a depreciation deduction does not fulfill the purpose behind
the allowance of the depreciation deduction because (1) the taxpayer
has not yet made an investment which needs to be recovered, and
(2) since the taxpayer is not personally liable on the debt, there is no
assurance the investment will be made in the future. The theoretical
weakness inherent in the basis portion of Crane has been examined and
exposed by the Fifth Circuit. 150 The court suggests that the problems
arising from Crane should be solved by dealing "directly with the defi-
nitions of 'basis' and 'adjusted basis' either judicially or through legis-
lation."15' How should nonrecourse debt be treated when calculating
basis? An examination of the alternative treatments of nonrecourse
debt which have been discussed by the courts and scholars through the
years, however, will reveal that the solution put forth in Crane is the
preferable alternative. 5
2. The Alternative
Mrs. Crane proposed that the taxpayer's basis should be limited to
the taxpayer's equity in the property. 153 The Supreme Court noted that
the I.R.C. defines "basis of property"'51 4 and then points out that the
termproperty is not equivalent to equity.155 Adoption of this method of
calculating basis would ignore section 1012 of the I.R.C. which directs
that "the basis of property shall be the cost of such property," and sec-
146. Id. at 1063.
147. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
148. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1954), reprinted in 2 TAx MoMT. (BNA) §167.
149. Id. at 24.
150. 651 F.2d at 1064 n.9.
151. Id.
152. See generally Simmons I, supra note 21.
153. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 3 (1947).
154. See I.R.C. §§1012, 1014, 1015 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
155. See 331 U.S. at 6.
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tion 1014 which defines the basis for property acquired from a decedent
as "the fair market value of the property at the date of the decedent's
death." Since equity is the excess of the fair market value of the prop-
erty over the amount of the mortgage,15 6 constant reevaluation of the
fair market value of the property would be required to ascertain the
taxpayer's equity, and therefore the basis, if Mrs. Crane's proposal
were accepted. Needless to say this system would be an administrative
nightmare.15 7 A system which would calculate the taxpayer's basis in
property from the taxpayer's equity would be inconsistent with the
mandate of Treasury Regulation 1.167 (a)-l 58 describing the deprecia-
tion allowance as:
• . . that amount which should be set aside for the taxable year in
accordance with a reasonably consistent plan ... ,so that the aggre-
gate of the amount set aside, plus the salvage value, will, at the end
of the estimated useful life of the depreciable property, equal the cost
or other basis of the property. 159
If the taxpayer's equity were allowed to constitute the basis, a "rea-
sonably consistent plan" for determining the depreciation deduction
would be impossible to implement. The taxpayer could foreseeably
manipulate the situation to his advantage by making payments when
large deductions were needed.' 60
Another alternative to including the full amount of the nonrecourse
debt in basis is to calculate the basis from the taxpayer's equity, and to
calculate the depreciation deduction from the fair market value of the
property at the time of purchase.16' This theory presumably entails the
use of the taxpayer's equity as the "basis" for determining gain or loss,
and the use of the fair market value at the time of purchase as the
"basis" for determining the depreciation deduction. This method
would be totally inconsistent with the legislative mandate that "Itihe
basis on which exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence are to be
allowed in respect of any property shall be the adjusted basis provided
in section 1011 for the purpose of determining the gain on the sale or
other disposition of such property." 62
A final alternative would be to eliminate depreciation deductions
which exceed the amount actually invested by the taxpayer, or for
which he or she is personally liable. Recently, section 465 of the I.R.C.,
156. See id. at 3.
157. See id. at 10.
158. Courts have accorded certain regulations "force of law status." See J. FREELAND, S.
LIND, R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 36 (3d ed. 1981).
159. Treas. Reg. §1.167(a)-i, T.D. 7203, 1972-2 C.B. 30 (emphasis added).
160. See 331 U.S. at 10.
161. See id. at 9-10.
162. I.R.C. §167(g) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Pacic Law Journal / Vol 14
which limits a taxpayer's deductions in such a manner, 163 was enacted;
Congress, however, failed to include investments in real property
within the broad sweep of the "at-risk provisions."'161
The various alternatives to the basis portion of Crane which have
been discussed are more problematic than allowing the taxpayer to in-
clude the full amount of nonrecourse debt in basis.'65 The Crane solu-
tion is preferable because it is administratively manageable, 166 and it
takes into consideration the function of depreciation as a tax account-
ing device based on estimates of the annual cost of using an asset to
produce income, and matching that cost to the income produced. 67 If
this system exists, however, it must be coupled with a mechanism which
allows previously sheltered income to be brought back into the system
to be taxed. The amount realized portion of Crane provides this type
of a mechanism.
B. Including Nonrecourse Debt in Amount Realized
The full amount of nonrecourse debt should be included in the
amount realized upon the disposition of the property, regardless of the
fair market value of the property. Any other solution to this problem
would exempt otherwise taxable income from taxation.'6 An analysis
of the reasoning used by the Fifth Circuit in reaching its decision in
Tufts will reveal that it is based on false premises and evidences an
acute misunderstanding of the problem involved.
The Fifth Circuit in Tufts expresses the opinion that the portion of
Crane that mandates that the amount of nonrecourse debt assumed by
the buyer of property be included in the amount realized is based on
the "economic benefit" theory. The "economic. benefit"'169 theory is
based on language in Crane to the effect
that a mortgagor, not personally liable on the debt, who sells the
property subject to the mortgage and for additional consideration,
realizes a benefit in the amount of the mortgage as well as the
boot .... We are ... concerned with the reality that an owner of
property, mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the property
will sell, must and will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as
163. See id. §465.
164. "The effectiveness of the at risk limitation. . . will be enhanced by expanding its appli-
cation to certain closely held corporations and to all activities other than real estate." President's
Proposals, supra note 70, at 229.
165. Seegenerall, Simmons I, supra note 21.
166. See 331 U.S. at 10.
167. See Simmons I, supra note 21, at 1.
168. See Simmons II, supra note 22, at 4.
169. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1981).
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if they were his personal obligations.' 7 °
The Tufts court does not dispute that when the taxpayer is personally
liable on a note and sells the property to a third party who takes subject
to the note, the "economic benefit" to the taxpayer is equal to the
amount of the note.' 7 ' The court, however, voiced grave misgivings
about the application of the "economic benefit" theory to the situation
in which the taxpayer is not personally liable on the debt, 72 because
[i]f the taxpayer decides, for any reason whatsoever, that he no
longer wants the burdens and responsibilities that accompany owner-
ship, he can transfer the property to a third party with absolutely no
regard to that party's willingness or ability to meet the mortgage obli-
gations, yet rest assured that his other assets cannot be reached.'
73
Therefore, the court refused to extend the Crane holding beyond its
facts. 174
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of the "economic benefit" theory is es-
sentially sound.175 If the taxpayer is not personally liable on the debt
the economic benefit obtained if the buyer takes subject to the debt is
limited to the value of the building, which is the only asset the taxpayer
would lose if he or she defaulted on the note.176 If the holding in Crane
pertaining to amount realized is founded on the "economic benefit"
theory, then the result in Tufts, that the amount realized should be lim-
ited to the fair market value of the property, is the only logical one. 117
The Fifth Circuit's argument, however, is based on the false premise
that "economic benefit" is the theoretical foundation of the Crane doc-
trine. 17  This proposition coupled with the Fifth Circuit's assertion that
the Supreme Court was not concerned with the possibility of double
170. 331 U.S. at 14 (footnotes omitted).
171. See 651 F.2d at 1061.
That proposition and the economic principle from which it derives are indisputable:
when a debt on which a taxpayer is personally liable is discharged, the taxpayer is freed
from the necessity of paying the obligation with cash or other assets equal in value to the
principal amount of the debt.
Id.
172. See id. at 1063.
173. Id. at 1062.
174. See id. at 1063.
175. See Bittker, supra note 9, at 282 ("The benefit rationale of Crane is unpersuasive .
see also Del Cotto, supra note 17, at 85.
176. See Del Cotto, supra note 17, at 85, wherein Professor Del Cotto suggests that:
To the extent that the amount of the mortgage exceeds the value of the property, no
property of a mortgagor not personally liable could be used to satisfy the mortgage.
Thus the taxpayer would get no 'benefit' to this extent from the disposition of the prop-
erty subject to the mortgage. If the 'economic benefit' theory is to be applied consist-
ently, no gain is realized in this amount.
177. "Consistent application of a theory of 'economic benefit' limits the amount of the mort-
gage that is realized .... " Del Cotto, supra note 17, at 85.
178. See Del Cotto, supra note 17, at 84 wherein the author postulates that the "economic
benefit" theory was "not essential to the decision" in Crane; see also Bittker; supra note 9, at 285
n.14 ("in my view, the economic benefit theory should be rejected as wholly fallacious,").
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deductions evidences a failure to comprehend the complexities of the
issues involved.
C Double Deductions
In Crane the United States Supreme Court asserted that
"the crux of this case, really, is whether the law permits her to ex-
clude allowable deductions from consideration in computing gain.
We have already showed [sic] that, if it does, the taxpayer can enjoy
a double deduction, in effect, on the same loss of assets." 179
The Third Circuit in Millar held that this was the theoretical founda-
tion for the decision in Crane.'8 0 In Tufts the Commissioner invoked
the Crane double deduction language in support of a tax benefit the-
ory: the argument, in essence, is that a taxpayer who has previously
enjoyed the benefit of large tax deductions, without placing his own
assets at risk, has, by taking those deductions, improved his economic
position, thus realizing gain.18 '
Rejecting this argument the Fifth Circuit asserts that, in its opinion, the
double deduction language was not the theoretical foundation for the
decision in Crane.'I2 The Tufts court supports its assertion by pointing
out that the Supreme Court did not raise the issue of double deductions
until the last paragraph of the Crane opinion, and then only in re-
sponse to the constitutional argument made by the taxpayer.8 3
The Fifth Circuit's position fails to consider the exact language used
by the Court when it voiced its concern about the possibility of "double
deductions." The Crane Court indicated that the "crux of this case,
really is whether the law permits her to exclude allowable deductions.
from consideration in computing gain." ' 4 This was the main issue of
the case, not just of the constitutional argument. Furthermore, the
Court went on to state that "we have already showed [sic] that, if it
does, the taxpayer can enjoy a double deduction .... .,15 The
Supreme Court was under the impression that the subject had been
discussed and proven earlier in the opinion. The Court's failure to use
the appellation "double deduction" prior to the last paragraph in the
opinion does not signify that it was unconcerned with the concept em-
bodied by this term. On the contrary, the Court's language indicating
that the "crux of the case" was whether Mrs. Crane would, in effect, be
179. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (emphasis added).
180. See Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 215 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Simmons 11, supra
note 22, at 22.
181. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1060 (5th Cir. 1981).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. 331 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 15-16.
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allowed a double deduction, evidences that the Court considered this to
be a pivotal issue.
Perhaps anticipating that its argument, asserting that the concern for
avoiding double deduction did not constitute the theoretical justifica-
tion for the Crane decision, could be considered weak, the Fifth Circuit
provided an alternative.1 6 The court argued that even if the Supreme
Court had been concerned with the possibility of the taxpayer ob-
taining a double deduction, the concern was unwarranted.' 87 To justify
this proposition the Fifth Circuit made the following argument. Gain
from the disposition of property is the difference between the amount
realized and the adjusted basis of the property. 8 The I.R.C. mandates
that basis be adjusted downward to the extent of the depreciation de-
duction taken or allowed. 18
9
Thus, any tax benefits that the taxpayer may have received in the
form of prior deductions have already been factored into the gain
equation through adjustments to basis. Since those deductions have
been accounted for through adjustments to basis, it follows logically
that they cannot also support an expansion of the definition of
amount realized.' 90
The Fifth Circuit's "contention has, because of its simplicity, a be-
guiling appeal to it."'' Upon close examination, however, the argu-
ment proves to be illogical because it is based on a false premise. The
following argument will show that the rationale behind mandating that
adjustments to basis be made is totally different from that mandating
that the full amount of nonrecourse debt assumed by the buyer be in-
cluded in the amount realized.
The depreciation deduction enables the taxpayer to recover tax free
the investment made in an income producing asset.' 92 Basis is the
figure from which the depreciation deduction is calculated. 93 Basis is
also the figure that is subtracted from amount realized to determine the
gain realized by a taxpayer upon the disposition of property.'94 If basis
is not adjusted downward the taxpayer would recover tax free, an
amount exceeding the cost of the asset.
This is illustrated by a simple example. Taxpayer acquires a depre-
ciable asset at a cost of $1000. The asset has a useful life of five years
186. See 651 F.2d at 1060-61.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 1061.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. McCabe Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1105, 1109 (1964).
192. See id.
193. See generally I.R.C. §167 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
194. See id. §1001(a).
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and the taxpayer elects to use the straight-line method to depreciate it.
The taxpayer holds the asset for three years and takes depreciation de-
ductions totaling $600. At the end of the fourth year the taxpayer sells
the asset to a third party for $500. At this point the taxpayer has recov-
ered $600 of the original investment, through the depreciation deduc-
tion. If the basis is not adjusted to reflect that recovery, then the
formula for calculating gain or loss would be:
Amount Realized = $ 500
(minus) Basis = $1000
Loss = $ 500
An additional deduction would accrue to the taxpayer, to account for
the $500 loss. Together with the previous $600 deduction the taxpayer
would recover $1100, $100 over the original investment. If basis had
been adjusted downward to reflect the depreciation taken the taxpayer
would have realized a gain of $100 after recovering, tax free, the cost of
the asset. The reason for mandating that basis be adjusted downward
operates whether the depreciable asset was paid for in cash, financed by
recourse debt, or by nonrecourse debt. 195
The problem that arises when a taxpayer is allowed to take
depreciation deductions, which enable the taxpayer to recover an
investment, an investment not yet made because the property is
financed by debt, is a different matter altogether. The Tufts court's
assertion that
[t]o account for those deductions twice in the same equation by ex-
panding the definition of amount realized as well as adjusting basis
downward would, we think, be taxing the taxpayer twice on the same
component of gain, 196
illustrates that it failed to comprehend the argument made by the Com-
missioner and the concerns voiced by the Supreme Court in the last
paragraph of the Crane opinion. Perhaps the unfortunate use of the
term "double deduction" is responsible for creating the confusion that
permeates the footnote 37 area.
One learned commentator has correctly pointed out that Mrs. Crane
did not receive the benefit of a "double deduction." 197 She merely took
advantage of the yearly depreciation deductions available to her while
she owned the building. 198 The same commentator, however, has as-
serted that Mr. and Mrs. Tufts did enjoy a "double deduction" because
they took the depreciation deductions and then claimed a long term
195. See generally id. §1016.
196. 651 F.2d at 1061.
197.. See Simmons II, supra note 22, at 27.
198. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 3 n.2 (1947).
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capital loss upon the disposition of the property. 199 This interpretation
of the term "double deduction" is counter-intuitive. A double deduc-
tion implies taking the same deduction twice, i.e., taking the yearly de-
preciation deduction twice in the same year. The taxpayers in Tufts
took the depreciation deductions that they were entitled to. Later,
when the Commissioner determined a deficiency they claimed a capital
loss deduction. Mr. and Mrs. Tufts did not attempt to take the same
deduction twice; they claimed two separate deductions.
If Mrs. Crane did not enjoy a double deduction, what did the
Supreme Court mean when it stated that unless the law allowed her to
include allowable deductions in computing gain she would enjoy a
double deduction?2" Although the term "double deduction" is a mis-
nomer the idea expressed by the Crane Court is not difficult to discern.
The basis portion of Crane allows
investors to deduct depredation, .. even though financed by non-
recourse borrowing, hence exceeding their current cash outlay; but
when the investment is sold, the nonrecourse liabilities are includable
in the amount realized in computing gains, so that the deductions
taken in the earlier years are-or should be-recaptured at the end
of the road.20'
An example will illustrate these concepts. A taxpayer purchases a
building used in the production of income, totally debt financed for
$30,000. The building's useful life is fifteen years, at the end of which
the salvage value is zero. The straight-line method of depreciation is
used. The taxpayer holds the building for three years and pays nothing
on the principal debt. At the end of the three years the taxpayer sells
the building, which has a fair market value of $20,000, to a third party
who takes subject to the nonrecourse debt and pays no boot. During
the three years in which he held the property the taxpayer claimed and
was allowed a total of $6,000 in depreciation deductions. The taxpayer
had made no cash investment, therefore, the deduction did not serve to
recover any investment; instead it sheltered other income from taxa-
tion. Upon the disposition of the property the taxpayer will be allowed
to recoup the balance of the total investment, $24,000 ($30,000 -
$6,000), because the I.R.C. does not provide for the amount received by
the taxpayer for property to be taxed; only gain is taxed, that is, the
amount received by taxpayer after the. dollars invested have been re-
covered.202 The taxpayer in this case will recover, through deductions
199. See Simmons H, supra note 22, at 30-31.
200. 331 U.S. at 15-16.
201. Bittker, supra note 9, at 283.
202. See I.R.C. §1001(a).
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and the resulting decrease in taxable income, the full $30,000 invest-
ment. The problem here is that the taxpayer never invested his or her
own $30,000. It is totally inconsistent with the purpose of allowing de-
preciation deductions to allow this taxpayer to recover a $30,000 invest-
ment that was never made. If the full amount of the nonrecourse debt
is included in the amount realized, this inconsistency is eliminated.
When this is done the taxpayer realizes a gain of $6,000 ($30,000 -
$24,000). This amount equals the amount of otherwise taxable income
the taxpayer was allowed to "shelter" from the federal tax collector by
taking the depreciation deduction before making the investment.
If the Tufts holding is left undisturbed, the taxpayer in this hypothet-
ical will incur a loss of $4,000.203 He or she will also have "recovered"
the $30,000 investment that was never made and $6,000 of otherwise
taxable income will never be taxed. "These indefensible tax results
arise only because footnote 37 of Crane attaches weight to something
that cannot possibly affect the taxpayer once he disposes of the prop-
erty, that is, its value. ' '204
Tufts has created a split in the circuits, 20 5 "[dieclining real estate val-
ues coupled with more liberal depreciation allowances make the fact
pattern envisioned by the footnote more likely to arise. ' 20 6 The time is
ripe for the Supreme Court to delve into the mysteries of footnote 37
and decide the issue once and for all.207 The preceding discussion illus-
trates that the high Court should reject the theories posited in Tufts and
extend the amount realized holding in Crane to those situations in
which the amount of the nonrecourse debt assumed by the buyer of
property exceeds the fair market value of the property.20 8 Since the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Tufts2° the opportunity to
sound the death knell for footnote 37 is at hand. If the Court rejects the
rationale of the footnote, do Mr. and Mrs. Tufts lose all hope of win-
ning their case? They do not because of a clever argument put forth by
their attorneys.
SECTION 752
The taxpayers in Tufts argued that since the case involved the sale of
a partnership interest, subsection 752(d) operated to limit the amount
203. 24,000 - 20,000 = 4,000.
204. Bittker, supra note 9, at 284.
205. Friedland, supra note 36, at 520.
206. Friedland, supra note 36, at 513.
207. See Friedland, supra note 36, at 520.
208. See generally Bittker, supra note 9.
209. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 50 U.S.L.W. 3881 (U.S. May 3, 1982) (certiorari granted).
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realized to the fair market value of the building.21 0 This argument was
rejected by the Tax Court.2 "1 The Fifth Circuit did not base its opinion
on the taxpayer's interpretation of subsection 752(c),2 12 but language in
a footnote suggests that the holding in the case is consistent with Con-
gressional mandate as evidenced by subsection (c).213 Because the
Supreme Court has granted the Commissioner's petition for a writ of
certiorari in Tufts, and the taxpayers may rely on this rationale, when
the United States Supreme Court hears arguments, it is imperative to
analyze the function of section 752, and determine the merits of the
taxpayer's argument.
Section 752 provides:
Treatment of certain liabilities
(a) Increase in partner's liabilities. - Any increase in a partner's
share of the liabilities of a partnership, or any increase in a partner's
individual liabilities by reason of the assumption by such partner of
partnership liabilities, shall be considered as a contribution of money
by such partner to the partnership.
(b) Decrease in partner's liabilities. - Any decrease in a partner's
share of the liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner's
individual liabilities by reason of the assumption by the partnership
of such individual liabilities, shall be considered as a distribution of
money to the partner by the partnership.
(c) Liability to which property is subject. - For purposes of this
section, a liability to which property is subject shall, to the extent of
the fair market value of such property, be considered as a liability of
the owner of the property.
(d) Sale or exchange of an interest. - In the case of a sale or ex-
change of an interest in a partnership, liabilities shall be treated in
the same manner as liabilities in connection with the sale or ex-
change of property not associated with partnerships.214
The taxpayers argued that the fair market value limitation of subsec-
tion (c) applies to limit the amount realized upon the" sale or exchange
of a partnership interest.21 5 The Commissioner countered with the as-
sertions that (1) subsection (c) applies only to calculate the basis in
property distributed by or contributed to the partnership, 216 and (2) the
sale or exchange of a partnership interest to a third party is governed
210. Seegeneraly Brief for Appellants, and Reply Brief for Appellant, Tufts v. Commissioner,
651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
211. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 769 (1978).
212. See generally Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
213. See id. at 1063 n.8.
214. I.R.C. §752 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
215. See 651 F.2d at 1063 n.8.
216. See 1d.
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by subsection (d).2 17 The position taken by the Commissioner, as will
be shown, is the more rational view.
To support its claim that the decision reached in Tufts is consistent
with the "congressional understanding of the Crane case,"2 8 the Fifth
Circuit states that "§752(c) is generally regarded to be an intended cod-
ification of the Crane doctrine."2 9 To support that proposition, the
court cites an article by Alan W. Perry.220 The court, however, omits to
add that Perry's statement applies only to the basis portion of Crane,22 '
a distinction that did not escape the Tax Court.222 If the purpose of
section 752 is to provide the basis of a contribution of encumbered
property to a partnership, on distribution of such property by a part-
nership to a partner, then it is tantamount to blasphemy to cite subsec-
tion (c) as providing a fair market limitation to amount realized, when
a partnership interest is sold to a party not involved in the partnership.
The exploration of subchapter K of the I.R.C., which deals with
"partners and partnerships" '223 will illustrate that section 752, except for
subsection (d), deals with basis. Section 705 provides that the basis in a
partner's interest shall be the basis of the interest contributed.224 It also
provides that the basis shall be decreased by the extent of distributions
made by the partnership.225 Section 752 mandates that an increase of a
partner's liabilities resulting from an increase in the partnership's lia-
bilities or from an assumption by the partner of the partnership's liabil-
ities will be considered as a contribution of money by such a partner.226
This will then increase the partner's basis in the partnership's inter-
est.227 A decrease in a partner's share of the liabilities of the partner-
ship resulting from the assumption of the liabilities of the partnership
will be treated as a distribution by the partnership,228 and thus will
serve to decrease the partner's basis in the partnership interest.229 Sub-
section (a) provides a mechanism for attaching a value to the liabilities.
This is the function of subsection (c), as evidenced by the committee
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. See Perry, LimitedPartnerships and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAx L.
RE'. 525, 542 (1972), wherein the author asserts that "[s]ection 752 has generally been regarded as
a codification of the Crane rulefor thepurpose of determining the basis of a specific asset i.e., the
basis of a partner's interest in a partnership." (emphasis added).
222. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 767 (1978).
223. See generally I.R.C. §§701-761 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
224. Id. §705(a).
225. Id. §705(a)(2).
226. Id. §752(a).
227. Id. §705(a).
228. Id. §752(b).
229. Id. §705(a)(2).
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reports made pursuant to section 752. "The transfer ofproperty subject
to a liability by a partner to a partnershp, or by the partnersh&l to a
partner, shall, to the extent of the fair market value of such property, be
considered a transfer of the amount of the liability along with the prop-
erty.",2 30 When an interest in a partnership is transferred to a third
party the "liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in
connection with the sale or exchange of property not associated with
partnerships."'23 I Section 752(d) does not limit the amount realized be-
cause it is a mechanism for assessing basis. Section 752 is consistent
with the interpretation the courts have given Crane.232 Another reason
exists for arguing that subsection (c) does not limit the amount realized.
If it limited the amount realized to the fair market value of the prop-
erty, the limitation would have to operate on recourse as well as nonre-
course debt, because subsection (c) is not limited to nonrecourse
liability.233 This would be unacceptable even to the Fifth Circuit
2 34
and would certainly extend past the boundaries of the dicta stated in
footnote 37. 23
CONCLUSION
Crane, in allowing the taxpayer to include nonrecourse debt in basis,
provides a great advantage to the taxpayer holding depreciable
property financed by a nonrecourse mortgage. The depreciation de-
duction allows the taxpayer to recover an investment not yet made, and
thereby shelters other income. This is accomplished without the need
of an extensive out-of-pocket investment by the taxpayer, and with the
assurance that none of the taxpayer's other assets may be reached by
the creditor. If the full amount of nonrecourse debt assumed by the
buyer of the property is included in the amount realized, then the in-
come which was previously sheltered is recaptured and taxed, because
a higher gain is realized. If the amount realized is limited to the fair
market value of the property, when that value is less than the amount
of the debt, then a portion of the previously sheltered income is never
recaptured, and totally escapes taxation. If the basis portion of Crane
is left undisturbed, and it should be, then the fair market limitation
230. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1954), reprintedin TAX MGMT. (BNA) §752
(emphasis added).
231. I.R.C. §752(d).
232. See Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
"IThe taxpayer who seeks to invoke the [basis portion of] the Crane case must still show that the
value of the property securing the nonrecourse debt is equal to or greater than the amount of the
debt." Id.
233. See I.R.C. §752(c).
234. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1981).
235. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37.
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which is considered in footnote 37, and achieves the status of law in
Tufts, should be abolished.
On its face the Tufts case appears to provide a great advantage to
those taxpayers who can afford to invest in real estate tax shelters.
Tufts, however, could be a double-edged sword as evidenced by the
statement of the court to the effect that the abuses from tax shelters
result from the taxpayer's ability to include the nonrecourse debt in
calculating basis, and its suggestion that the solution to the problem is
for the courts or the Congress to deal with the basis problem directly.236
This obscure comment made in a footnote should fill the hearts of tax-
payers with fear and trembling and could provide a consolation to the
Commissioner. If the Tufts holding is upheld, further abuses are cer-
tain to result and it would not be illogical to assume that those abuses
will be countered by restrictive provisions, somewhat akin to the at-risk
provisions of the I.R.C. The comments of the Fifth Circuit indicate
that it would not be adverse to tightening the screws if the proper case
arose.
Estela Pino-Anderson
236. See 651 F.2d at 1064 n.9.
